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We find an increased
likelihood of outside di-
rector turnover follow-
ing forced CEO succes-
sion, especially among
those directors that are
closely aligned with
the outgoing CEO,
own little equity, and
make poor replacement
decisions. Directors
that remain on the
board, however, are
more likely to acquire
new directorships than
those that remain on
the board of a
matched-sample firm.
Overall, the results sug-
gest that outside direc-
tors who are not
aligned with the CEO
and own relatively
large equity stakes are
rewarded when they re-
move a poorly per-
forming CEO and re-
place him or her with
a CEO that improves
firm performance.
Kathleen A. Farrell
University of Nebraska—Lincoln
David A. Whidbee
Washington State University
The Consequences of Forced
CEO Succession for Outside
Directors*
I. Introduction
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue
that outside directors have an incentive to be ef-
fective monitors to signal to shareholders and la-
bor markets their value as directors. Recent em-
pirical evidence confirms that outside directors,
in some circumstances, perform an important
monitoring function (Brickley and James 1987;
Weisbach 1988; Byrd and Hickman 1992; and
Brickley, Coles, and Terry 1994). At the same
time, however, Mace (1986) and Jensen (1993)
argue that outside directors are not effective mon-
itors of senior managers because they have little
incentive to remove a poorly performing CEO.1
The conflicting arguments about the incentives
* We would like to thank Anthony Clarke and Jeremy
Brown for their research assistance. We appreciate the helpful
comments and suggestions of Sam Allgood, David Blackwell,
Beth Cooperman, Claire Crutchley, John Geppert, Stan Hoi,
Gordon Karels, Leslie Levy, Herman Manakyan, George
McCabe, Myra Moore, Jeff Netter, Rick Sias, Tom Zorn, and
an anonymous referee. David Whidbee appreciates the finan-
cial support provided by the California State University, Sacra-
mento, Research, Scholarship and Creative Activities Award
program. Kathleen Farrell appreciates receiving partial support
from the 1996 Hicks Foundation Summer Research Grant. We
are responsible for all errors in the manuscript.
1. See Jensen (1993) and the Wall Street Journal article by
Lublin and Duff (1995) for examples of corporate boards that
failed to remove a poorly performing CEO.
(Journal of Business, 2000, vol. 73, no. 4)
ª 2000 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0021-9398/2000/7304-0004$02.50
597
598 Journal of Business
confronting outside directors are difficult to test empirically because
of the difficulty in establishing a relation between board effectiveness
and the incentives faced by outside directors. Removing a poorly per-
forming CEO, however, is one of the most observable signals that out-
side directors can send to shareholders and labor markets about their
effectiveness as directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside
directors’ principal compensation for serving on corporate boards is in
the form of the reputation they develop as expert monitors of managers.
Therefore, the incentives they face are related to their continued service
on the board and their opportunities for additional directorships.
We analyze the incentives confronting outside directors by examin-
ing the consequences of firing a CEO. If directors are rewarded by the
director labor market for removing a poorly performing CEO, we
would expect to observe an increase in the number of other director-
ships they hold and a lower (or at least unchanged) probability of depar-
ture from the current board. On the other hand, if directors suffer ad-
verse consequences for forcing CEO turnover, we would expect to
observe a decrease in the number of other directorships held and a
higher probability of departure from the current board.
Using a sample of 66 forced CEO turnovers between 1982 and 1992,
we compare 540 outside directors that forcibly remove their CEOs to
576 outside directors from a matched sample that do not forcibly re-
move their CEOs.2 Because the primary objective of this study is to
analyze the consequences of removing an incumbent CEO, we examine
whether the directors that force CEO turnover are more likely to leave
the board than the matched-sample directors. In addition, we examine
the number of other directorships gained or lost by the directors that
force CEO turnover relative to the matched-sample directors.
An additional objective of this study is to examine the characteristics
of individual directors that benefit (remain on the board or acquire addi-
tional directorships) from the forced removal of the CEO and those
that suffer adverse consequences (leave the board or lose other director-
ships). The corporate governance literature identifies several director
and firm characteristics associated with increased board effectiveness.
These characteristics include, for example, small board size (Yermack
1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998), director share ownership
(Shivdasani 1993), and director independence (Weisbach 1988). We
shed additional light on whether these same director and firm character-
2. We define forced turnover as a turnover that occurs due to pressure by the board of
directors, management shakeup, resignation, firing, or poor performance as described in
the Wall Street Journal. Our matching criteria restrict the matching firms to firms that do
not experience forced turnover over a 5-year period surrounding the turnover date. The
matching firms include 28 firms that experience voluntary turnover and 38 firms that experi-
ence no turnover.
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istics are associated with the penalties or rewards experienced by out-
side directors that remove a poorly performing CEO.
The results suggest that although outside directors that force CEO
turnover are more likely to leave the board, some directors benefit from
the forced removal of the CEO. The directors that hold large equity
stakes, are not closely aligned with the outgoing CEO, and make good
CEO replacement decisions are more likely to acquire additional direc-
torships and less likely to suffer the same adverse consequences as
other directors that force CEO turnover. The ex post rewards offered
to these directors suggest that some directors have an incentive to re-
move a poorly performing CEO, consistent with the arguments made
by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983). However, the rewards
seem to extend only to those directors that remain on the board of the
forced turnover firm. Directors that leave the board tend to be those
that were closely aligned with the outgoing CEO and own little of the
firm’s equity. These same directors are more likely to lose other direc-
torships relative to the directors that remain on the forced turnover
boards. Our results suggest that simply removing a poorly performing
CEO is not sufficient to be rewarded in the market for their services
as directors. Outside directors also need to make good replacement
decisions.
Our results provide some support for Mace (1986) and Jensen’s
(1993) argument that directors have little incentive to remove a poorly
performing CEO because they are faced with a higher probability of
leaving the current board. We also find, however, that directors with
characteristics associated with effective monitoring (e.g., independence
from the CEO, substantial equity ownership, and sufficient decision-
making expertise to make good replacement decisions) tend to be re-
warded for removing a poorly performing CEO through a higher proba-
bility of remaining on the forced-turnover board and an increased likeli-
hood of gaining an additional outside directorship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the sample selection process and the data, including descriptive
statistics for the firms and directors in the turnover and matched sam-
ples. Section III presents an analysis of the likelihood that a director
leaves the board after CEO turnover. Section IV analyzes changes in
the number of other directorships held by outside directors. Section V
concludes the article.
II. Sample Design
A. Selecting the Sample of Forced CEO Turnovers
We identified a sample of 66 forced CEO turnovers using the Forbes
Survey of Executive Compensation (hereafter Forbes) and the Wall
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Street Journal. We analyzed all firms that appeared in Forbes from
1981 to 1992 and documented CEO turnover using either Forbes or
proxy statements.3 After excluding regulated firms and CEOs that were
in office for less than 2 years, we investigated the reasons for the 545
remaining turnovers.4 We identified 107 forced CEO turnovers using
the Wall Street Journal.5 A turnover is classified as forced if the article
discussing the departure mentions pressure from the board of directors,
resignation, scandal, reorganization, demotion, policy or personality
disagreement, or poor performance.6 From the 107 forced turnovers,
we lost 41 additional turnovers due to an inability to find an appropriate
matching firm, missing proxy statements, or incomplete performance
data on Standard and Poor’s Annual Industrial Compustat. Any firms
that were acquired within 4 years after forced CEO turnover were also
excluded. The final sample consists of 540 outside directors associated
with 66 forced CEO turnovers in 63 firms.
B. Matched Sample
To determine if the directors that force CEO turnover experience sig-
nificant consequences in terms of their tenure on the board and the
number of other directorships they hold, we create a matched sample
of directors that do not force CEO turnover and satisfy the following
criteria: (1) the matching firm operates in the same two-digit standard
industrial classification (SIC) code as the forced-turnover firm;7 (2) the
matching firm’s total assets are between 50% and 150% of the forced-
turnover firm’s total assets; (3) the matching firm’s performance is
comparable to the forced-turnover firm’s performance, as measured by
annual stock returns; and (4) the matching firm does not experience a
forced turnover for 5 years surrounding the turnover date and was not
acquired within 4 years after the turnover date of the forced-turnover
firm.
3. Proxy statements were used to identify turnovers in firms that were not consistently
listed in the Forbes survey.
4. We place these restrictions on the sample because regulated firms have been shown
to be significantly different from industrial organizations (Baysinger and Zardkoohi 1986;
Subrahmanyam, Rangan, and Rosenstein 1997). The 2-year restriction eliminates turnovers
of interim CEOs.
5. The percentage of CEO turnovers that are classified as forced is 19.6% in our sample.
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2000) find that 20% of the 636 CEO turnovers in their sample
that occur during the same period are forced. Studies by Denis and Denis (1995) and
Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) find similar forced-turnover rates.
6. In defining forced departure, we use criteria similar to Blackwell and Farrell (1999),
who combine the criteria used by Weisbach (1988), Gilson (1989), and Parrino (1997).
7. We use two-digit SIC codes to identify possible matches. The set of possible matches
using three- or four-digit SIC codes would be too small when combined with our other
matching criteria. In addition, Clark (1989) finds that SIC codes are more effective at
dividing firms into broad industrial groups than at dividing firms into three- and four-digit
segments to represent economic markets more closely.
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We use an industry- and size-matched sample to control for potential
industry and size effects on director turnover and other directorships
held by directors. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) argue that if outside di-
rectors are chosen for their industry expertise, matching companies by
industry will control for the different opportunities for outside director-
ships available to managers in different industries. In addition, industry
classifications may act as a proxy for growth opportunities. Booth and
Deli (1996) find that growth opportunities are negatively related to the
number of outside directorships held by CEOs. Parrino (1997) finds
evidence that homogeneous industries have a higher incidence of out-
side CEO succession. He argues that firms in homogeneous industries
require less firm-specific human capital and that the industry-specific
human capital is transportable. Therefore, directors may have more op-
portunities available for additional directorships in homogeneous in-
dustries. DeFond and Park (1999) find that the frequency of CEO turn-
over is greater in highly competitive industries than in less competitive
industries. These industry differences impacting CEO turnover may
also apply to director turnover. The same arguments may be made for
controlling for firm size.
Matching on performance controls for the empirical regularity that
CEO turnover is negatively associated with firm performance.8 Match-
ing on performance also controls for Kaplan and Reishus’s (1990)
finding that poorly performing managers hold fewer directorships than
managers of other firms. It is worth nothing however, that Hermalin
and Weisbach (1988) do not find any evidence that poor stock-price
performance affects the likelihood of departure of outside directors.
After identifying all potential matched-sample firms using two-digit
SIC codes and asset size, we compare the performance of the forced-
turnover-sample firm to the performance of each potential matched-
sample firm. Specifically, the average annual stock return during the
2 years prior to turnover for the forced-turnover-sample firm was com-
pared to the average annual stock return over the same period for each
of the potential matched-sample firms. Average annual stock returns
were computed using the Center for Research in Security Price’s
(CRSP) daily returns file. The potential matched-sample firms were
then ranked based on the absolute value of the difference in their perfor-
mance and the turnover firm’s performance, with those firms having
the smallest difference being ranked first. We then selected the highest
ranked firm that also satisfied the fourth criterion. We measure firm
performance using stock returns rather than accounting measures of
performance because accounting measures of firm performance do not
8. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988), and Parrino (1997), among oth-
ers, document an inverse relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance.
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exhibit as much variation as stock returns (see, e.g., Allgood and Farrell
2000).
The turnover process itself may result in some restructuring of the
board independent of the type of turnover. A new CEO may install his
own board regardless of whether he is replacing a CEO that was forced
out or a CEO that retired. To control for a general turnover effect, we
identify firms in our matched sample that experience voluntary CEO
turnover.9 If the consequences experienced by outside directors that
force CEO turnover are simply due to CEO turnover, we should not find
any significant differences between these directors and the directors of
firms that experience voluntary CEO turnover.
C. Data Collection for Board of Directors
We collect board membership data from the last proxy statement filed
in the 12 months prior to the forced-turnover date for the forced-turn-
over sample and the matched sample.10 Based on this board member-
ship, we track outside directors’ board memberships 4 years after the
CEO turnover for those directors remaining on the board by analyzing
the proxy statement 5 years from the preturnover proxy date. We
choose 5 years from the proxy statement preceding forced turnover
because many boards of directors have three classes of directors with
staggered 3-year terms.11 Consequently, within 4 years following turn-
over, the new CEO has had the opportunity to be involved in the elec-
tion process of every member on the board.
Using proxy statements, we document the age, tenure as director,
affiliation, other directorships, committee memberships, and equity
ownership of each director prior to forced CEO turnover and 4 years
following turnover for those that remain on the board. We do this for
both the forced-turnover sample and the matched sample.12
In determining other directorships, we use the preturnover proxy
9. Step 4 in the matching process identifies whether a matching firm experiences CEO
turnover during the 5 years surrounding the turnover date of the forced-turnover firm. By
reading the Wall Street Journal announcement about the turnover, we determine whether
the turnover was forced or voluntary in nature. This process identifies 28 matching firms
that experience voluntary CEO turnover.
10. On average, the preturnover proxy statement predates CEO turnover by 6.25 months.
11. Thirty-seven of the 66 firms in the forced-turnover sample have 3-year staggered
terms. Twenty-eight of the 66 matching firms have 3-year staggered terms.
12. In determining director affiliation, consistent with Weisbach (1988), Hermalin and
Weisbach (1991), and Klein (1998), we place directors in one of three categories: inside
directors, affiliated outside directors, or independent outside directors. Inside directors in-
clude corporate officers. Affiliated outside directors have a specified business relation with
the firm, are retirees from the firm, or are related to a top officer. Affiliated outside directors
include investment bankers, attorneys, commercial bankers that have made loans to the
firm, consultants, officers and directors of the firm’s suppliers and customers, and inter-
locking directors (the firm’s board includes a CEO on whose board the firm’s CEO serves).
Independent outside directors have no affiliation with the firm other than their directorships.
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statements to identify the directorships held by a director prior to forced
CEO turnover. We exclude directorships held with local banks, small
local companies, and civic organizations (following Kaplan and Reis-
hus 1990). We rely on several sources to identify directorships held
by a director 4 years following forced CEO turnover. For directors
remaining on the board, we obtain information on other directorships
from the sample firm’s proxy statement. For directors that leave the
board, we search both the Standard & Poor’s Register of Corporations,
Directors and Executives (hereafter S&P Register) and Lexis-Nexis.
Volume 2 of the S&P Register provides detailed information on indi-
vidual directors.13 Lexis-Nexis is an on-line database that allows us to
search all electronically filed proxy statements for the names of individ-
ual directors.
The number of directorships gained and the number of directorships
lost are determined by comparing the preturnover directorships to the
postturnover directorships for those directors that remain on the board,
those that are listed in volume 2 of the S&P Register, and those found
in Lexis-Nexis. For those directors that leave the board and do not
appear in either Lexis-Nexis or volume 2 of the S&P Register, we are
not able to determine whether any directorships were gained. However,
we are able to determine the number of directorships lost using volume
1 of the S&P Register.14
Sales, total assets, and market value of equity are measured as of
the end of the year prior to CEO turnover for the forced turnover and
corresponding matched-sample firms. Preturnover firm performance is
measured using the average annual market-adjusted stock returns dur-
ing the 2 years prior to turnover.15 Postturnover performance is mea-
sured using the average annual market-adjusted stock returns for 1 and
4 years following turnover.
D. Analyzing the Matching of the Turnover Firms
The financial, ownership, and corporate governance characteristics of
the turnover and matched samples are shown in table 1. As expected,
both samples perform poorly prior to the turnover date as indicated by
market-adjusted stock returns. The forced-turnover sample, however,
performed significantly worse than the matched sample as indicated by
13. Volume 1 of the S&P Register is an annual publication that identifies about 437,000
of the officers and directors of more than 75,000 corporations. Volume 2 provides detailed
information on about 71,000 of the directors listed in volume 1.
14. For example, Richard J. Flamson III served as a director of Allergan when the firm
forced its CEO to resign. He also served on the board of Northrop Corporation. Flamson
left the board of Allergan and could not be found using Lexis-Nexis or volume 2 of the
S&P Register. Using volume 1 of the S&P Register, however, we were able to verify that
Flamson also left the board of Northrop Corporation.
15. Stock returns are market adjusted using the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-
weighted index.
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TABLE 1 Means and Tests for Differences in the Firms with Forced CEO
Turnover and Matched Firms
Means for Means for
Firms with Firms without
Forced CEO Forced CEO
Variable Turnover Turnover t-statistica
Preturnover financial characteristics:b
Sales (in billions of dollars)c 3.523 3.058 1.7231
Market value of equity (in billions of dol-
lars)c 2.791 2.271 1.226
Average annual market-adjusted stock re-
turn (%; 2 years)d 212.27 27.56 21.8311
Average return on average assets (%; 2
years) 4.89 6.23 21.286
Preturnover ownership structure:
Share ownership by inside directors of
the firm (%) 2.76 5.77 22.055*
Share ownership by affiliated outside di-
rectors (%) 1.13 1.17 2.060
Share ownership by independent outside
directors (%) 1.16 1.08 .147
Preturnover corporate governance:
Board size 11.9 12.3 2.824
Inside-director board membership (%) 29.04 28.72 .137
Affiliated-outsider board membership (%) 23.12 23.17 2.021
Independent-outsider board membership
(%) 47.84 48.10 2.093
Committee seats held by each inside di-
rector 1.03 .82 1.499
Committee seats held by each affiliated
outsider 1.85 1.63 1.427
Committee seats held by each indepen-
dent outsider 1.90 1.56 2.682**
Other directorships held by each inside
director 1.03 1.14 2.637
Other directorships held by each affili-
ated outsider 2.54 1.99 1.8451
Other directorships held by each indepen-
dent outsider 2.63 2.74 2.632
CEO age (in years) 59.1 58.0 .890
CEO tenure (in years as a director) 13.3 15.2 21.033
Average age for all directors (in years) 59.5 59.1 1.074
Average tenure for all directors (in years) 9.1 9.6 21.005
Postturnover performance:
Average annual market-adjusted stock re-
turn after turnover (%; 1 year)d 2.83 2.53 2.060
Average annual market-adjusted stock re-
turn after turnover (%; 4 years)d 21.04 21.96 .384
Note.—This table provides summary characteristics of 66 firms that forced CEO turnover during
the 1982–92 period and a matched sample of 66 firms that did not force CEO turnover. Stock return
data are from CRSP. Board of director data are from proxy statements. Other financial characteristics
are from Compustat.
a The t-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the difference between the two sample means is zero.
The t-statistic is based on paired comparisons between the two samples.
b Financial characteristics are measured as of the end of the year preceding turnover.
c Sales and market value of equity are expressed in constant 1990 dollars.
d Stock returns are market-adjusted using the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted
index.
1 Indicates that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Indicates that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Indicates that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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paired comparisons of market-adjusted stock returns between the two
samples. Financial statement measures of performance (return on aver-
age assets) do not show a significant difference between the forced-
turnover and matched-sample firms. Firms in the forced-turnover and
matched samples are of comparable size as measured by the market
value of equity. Using sales as a measure of size indicates that turnover
firms are significantly larger than matched-sample firms. Therefore, de-
pending on our proxy for firm size and performance, the forced-turn-
over sample appears to be larger and to have performed worse prior
to CEO turnover than the matched sample. We control for the potential
size and performance differences by including sales and preturnover
stock returns in the empirical analysis that follows.
The ownership structure and corporate governance characteristics of
directors in the turnover and matched samples are also shown in table
1. The percentage of equity ownership does not differ significantly be-
tween the forced-turnover and matched samples for both affiliated and
independent outside directors based on the preturnover proxy state-
ments. The percentage of equity ownership among insiders, however,
is significantly greater in the matched-sample firms. The preturnover
board composition in the forced-turnover sample is similar to that of the
matched sample with approximately 29% management, 23% affiliated
outsiders, and 48% independent outsiders.16
Interestingly, the number of committee seats held by independent
outsiders is significantly higher in the forced-turnover firms than in the
matched-sample firms. This could be due to the size differences be-
tween the two samples as larger firms tend to have more committees.
The number of other directorships is significantly greater for affiliated
outside directors in the forced-turnover firms relative to the matched-
sample firms. If these other directorships represent other opportunities
for these directors, they may be more willing to challenge managers.
The average age and tenure for all directors does not vary significantly
between the matched sample and forced-turnover sample prior to turn-
over.
III. Analysis of Director Departures
A. Director Departure Following Forced CEO Turnover
Although numerous studies examine CEO turnover, few studies exam-
ine director turnover and its relation to CEO turnover. Studies by Gil-
16. Byrd and Hickman (1992) document 37.5% insiders, 23.3% affiliated outsiders, and
39.2% independent outsiders in their sample. We include family members and former
employees in the affiliated outside group while Byrd and Hickman include these individuals
in their insider group. We identify more independent outsiders than Byrd and Hickman
but our count is consistent with Booth and Deli (1996), who classify 46.7% directors as
independent outsiders.
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son (1990) and Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (1995) suggest that director
turnover is positively related to CEO turnover when CEO turnover is
the result of bankruptcy proceedings, private reorganizations, and
takeovers. In both studies, the authors suggest that increased director
turnover is the consequence of directors being disciplined for poor
performance. However, disciplinary actions initiated by bankruptcy
proceedings, private reorganizations, and takeover markets may signal
the failure of internal control mechanisms. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that these disciplinary actions extend beyond senior managers to
include members of the board of directors. Absent external pressures,
there is little evidence of director turnover following CEO turnover.
For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) examine changes in board
composition over 13 years for a sample of 142 firms and find no evi-
dence that outside directors are more likely to leave the board following
CEO turnover.
1. Likelihood of director departure. Assuming the forced removal
of a CEO indicates that internal control mechanisms are functioning
effectively, directors who participate in a CEO’s removal should be
less likely (or at least no more likely) to experience turnover themselves
if the director labor market rewards these directors. According to Fama
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), by signaling to shareholders and
labor markets their willingness to discipline a CEO, these directors
demonstrate their concern about the performance of the firm and en-
hance their reputations as effective monitors.
An alternative argument is that the forced removal of a CEO is symp-
tomatic of ineffective monitoring. We abstract from this alternative in-
terpretation by including the set of matching firms that perform simi-
larly to the forced-turnover sample firms in our analysis.17 Using a
matched sample allows us to assume that the boards forcing CEO turn-
over are, at a minimum, more effective monitors than their matched-
sample counterparts.18
Still another argument is that the culture in the modern corporate
board discourages criticism and dissent (Jensen 1993). Lorsch and
MacIver (1989, p. 17) note that ‘‘many directors feel they serve at the
17. Although table 1 documents a significant difference between stock returns for the
forced-turnover and matched-sample firms, we find no significant difference in firm perfor-
mance when measured as average return on assets. Recent research (Weisbach 1988; Mur-
phy and Zimmerman 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998) suggests that accounting mea-
sures of performance are better predictors of management changes than are stock returns
and, therefore, may be a more useful benchmark for the board of directors when evaluating
CEOs. Therefore, we argue that we are effectively controlling for the observed inverse
relationship between firm performance and CEO or director turnover.
18. An alternative argument regarding the matched-sample firms is that no forced turn-
over occurs because management is entrenched. This interpretation further supports the
argument that at a minimum, the forced-turnover-sample firm directors are more effective
monitors than the matched-sample directors.
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pleasure of the CEO.’’ A new CEO may seek to replace those directors
that force CEO turnover with directors that are less likely to challenge
his or her decisions. Therefore, according to this argument, directors
who participate in the forced removal of a CEO should experience an
increased likelihood of departure.
Finally, there are several other potential reasons that are unrelated
to the directors’ monitoring effectiveness or the culture of corporate
boardrooms that may cause directors that force CEO turnover to face
an increased likelihood of leaving the board. Some directors may leave
the board voluntarily to avoid the increased demands of serving on a
board that has removed its CEO or to make room for new directors with
a fresh perspective, different skills, or areas of expertise. Regardless of
the reason, if the directors that force CEO turnover experience an in-
creased likelihood of departure relative to the directors of matched-
sample firms, this would suggest that they suffer adverse consequences
for their efforts in removing the CEO.
Table 2 reports the frequency of director departures as well as
changes in the status of individual directors. A higher frequency of
departure exists for outside directors in the forced-turnover-sample
firms relative to the matched-sample firms. Fifty-one percent (94 of
183) of affiliated outside directors and 47% (172 of 369) of independent
outside directors leave the forced turnover sample while only 43% (82
of 191) of affiliated outside directors and 39% (152 of 387) of indepen-
dent outside directors leave the matched sample. In this section, we
analyze these departures in an effort to determine whether the differ-
ence between the two samples is statistically significant and whether
the characteristics of individual directors or firms affect the likelihood
of director turnover.
2. Director characteristics and the likelihood of director depar-
ture. The corporate governance literature identifies several director-
specific and firm-specific characteristics associated with effective
boards. Many of these characteristics are related to the financial or rep-
utational incentives faced by directors. We add to this growing body
of literature by examining whether these director or firm characteristics
are related to the consequences directors experience after forcing CEO
turnover. We estimate a probit model with a dependent variable equal
to one if the director leaves the board within 4 years after turnover and
zero if the director remains on the board:
Probability that Director Leaves 5
f(X, FORCED VOLUNTARY), (1)
where X includes director age, independence, committee assignments,
equity ownership, other directorships held, board size, and postturnover
performance as discussed below as well as firm size and preturnover
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performance control variables.19 FORCED equals one if the director is
from the forced-turnover sample and zero if the director is from the
matched sample. VOLUNTARY equals one if the director is from a
matched-sample firm that experiences voluntary CEO turnover and
zero if the matched-sample firm does not experience CEO turnover.
VOLUNTARY equals zero for all directors in the forced-turnover sam-
ple by definition. Therefore, VOLUNTARY should capture the effects
of a voluntary CEO turnover while FORCED captures the effects of
a forced CEO turnover. In addition to estimating the model as a stan-
dard probit model, we estimate the model as a panel with random ef-
fects to control for firm effects.20
Because older directors are more likely to retire, we expect age to
be positively associated with director departure. There is no reason,
however, to expect the number of normal retirements to differ system-
atically between the turnover and matched samples.21
Studies by Gilson (1990) and Kini et al. (1995) show that disciplin-
ary actions against the CEO can extend to some directors when the
discipline is the result of external pressures. The same may be true
when the discipline is internal. Affiliated outside directors, including
relatives of top managers or retirees of the firm, tend to be more closely
aligned with the CEO. Therefore, the discipline of a forced CEO turn-
over may also extend to affiliated outside directors, leading to an in-
creased likelihood of their departure from the board following forced
CEO turnover. Similarly, directors’ committee assignments may indi-
cate how closely aligned they are with senior managers. We distinguish
between decision-making and monitoring committees because mem-
bers of a decision-making committee may have a greater impact on
firm performance and may therefore share responsibility and account-
ability with senior managers to a greater extent than directors that are
not members of decision-making committees.22 This close alignment
19. The characteristics that determine whether a director becomes the new CEO may
differ systematically from the characteristics that determine whether a director that does
not become the CEO remains on the board. Therefore, we exclude those directors that
become the CEO from this analysis. Table 2 indicates that 12 outside directors become
CEO in the forced-turnover sample. In the matched sample, two outside directors become
CEO.
20. Another way to control for firm effects is to estimate a fixed-effects model. However,
those variables that do not vary across directors within a firm (sales, board size, stock
returns, FORCED, VOLUNTARY) would be perfectly correlated with the effects.
21. To determine the sensitivity of our results to how we control for age, we reestimate
our results by excluding all outside directors who are older than 65 prior to the turnover
date. We choose a preturnover age of 65 since the normal age (per proxies) for mandatory
director retirement is between 70 and 72. The results for young outside directors are consis-
tent with the results for all outside directors except that the significance of the equity-
ownership variable in the forced-turnover sample is sensitive to the inclusion of random
effects.
22. In an analysis of board committee structure, Klein (1998) distinguishes between
board committees that are involved in the firm’s strategic decision-making process and
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and the impact that the directors’ decisions may have on firm perfor-
mance may cause these directors to be faced with an increased likeli-
hood of leaving the board following CEO turnover in the forced-turn-
over sample.
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) find a negative relation
between board size and firm performance, suggesting that smaller
boards perform more effectively than larger boards. They attribute
these results to the communication and decision-making problems as-
sociated with large groups. Directors that sit on large boards, therefore,
may be more inclined to resign from the board than directors that sit
on small boards.
Agency theory suggests that we should observe greater equity own-
ership for directors that remain after forced CEO turnover relative to
directors that leave.23 Several authors have argued that directors with
significant equity stakes take a more active interest in monitoring senior
managers.24 It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that these directors are
also less likely to leave the board voluntarily. Moreover, it will be more
difficult for a CEO to pressure these directors to leave the board.
Finally, a director’s decision-making expertise may affect the likeli-
hood of his or her leaving the board following CEO turnover. Unfor-
tunately, it is difficult to measure an individual director’s decision-
making expertise, especially when they are working within a group.
However, one indicator of a director’s decision-making expertise is
his service on other boards. If directors are chosen for their decision-
making expertise, then the number of other directorships held by a di-
rector may be a reasonable proxy for the director’s decision-making
expertise (Shivdasani 1993). At the same time, however, it may be a
measure of the demands placed on his time (Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker 1999).
A measure of the board’s aggregate decision-making expertise is the
success of the replacement CEO. We expect a director’s decision to
participate in the forced removal of a CEO to enhance his reputation
as a decision-making expert only if it is perceived to be a good decision.
Directors that make good replacement decisions should generate
above-average market-adjusted stock returns for the firm in the 1-year
board committees that primarily perform a monitoring function. She defines decision-mak-
ing committees to be finance and strategic-planning committees and monitoring committees
to be audit, compensation, and nominating committees.
23. Equity ownership by individual directors includes shares held by the director with
sole voting and investment power and shares held by immediate family members, including
trusts for children. Shares that can be acquired by exercising stock options are also included.
Similar results are found when shares that can be acquired by exercising stock options are
excluded from our measure of share ownership.
24. Empirical evidence tends to support this claim. See, e.g., Shivdasani (1993).
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period after turnover.25 Therefore, if the firm’s performance improves
after CEO turnover, we expect the board’s decision to remove the CEO
to be viewed favorably and the directors on those boards to be less
likely to leave the firm after turnover.
If the new CEO is an outsider, he may be more likely to install his
own board. Some evidence (Cannella and Lubatkin 1993; Parrino
1997) suggests that hiring a CEO from outside the firm signals to the
market that a firm wants to institute fundamental changes in how it
operates. Helmich and Brown (1972) and Wiersema (1992) find that
the rate of strategic change and the rate of organizational change are
greater following outside appointments. To capture the potential effect
of an outside replacement on director turnover, we include a dummy
variable in the analysis of the forced turnover sample.
B. Empirical Results for the Likelihood of Director Departure
We estimate three versions of equation (1). First, we estimate the model
for all outside directors in the combined samples and include the
FORCED and VOLUNTARY dichotomous variables to determine
whether forced and/or voluntary CEO succession affects the likelihood
of outside director succession during the following 4-year period. Next
we estimate the model separately for the forced-turnover and matched
samples to determine whether the firm and director characteristics have
different influences on outside director succession for the two samples.
Except for the stock-return variables, all variables are measured just
prior to the CEO turnover date for both the forced-turnover and
matched samples. Because table 1 indicates significant differences be-
tween the forced-turnover and matched-sample firms for total sales and
average annual market-adjusted stock returns, we include a control for
firm size and firm performance.26
1. Results for all outside directors. Table 3 reports results of esti-
mating equation (1) for all outside directors in the combined sample,
the forced-turnover sample, and the matched sample, respectively. The
first column for each sample shows the results of estimating equation
(1) for all outside directors without firm effects and the second column
reports results with random effects. As expected, age is an important
25. Longer-term measures of performance (e.g., 2-year and 4-year market-adjusted re-
turns) and accounting measures of performance (e.g., return on average assets) yield results
similar to those found using 1-year returns.
26. To determine whether our results are sensitive to differences in preturnover perfor-
mance, we reestimated equation (1) using the matched sample firms that performed poorly
(worse than the market) during the 2-year preturnover period and their corresponding
forced-turnover firms. These two sets of firms performed similarly (no significant differ-
ence) during the preturnover period. The probit results are similar to those shown in table
3 and are available from the authors.
612 Journal of Business
Ta
bl
e
3
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
o
fO
ut
sid
e
D
ir
ec
to
rs
Le
av
in
g
th
e
Bo
ar
d
o
fD
ir
ec
to
rs
by
Sa
m
pl
e
Co
m
bi
ne
d
Sa
m
pl
e
Fo
rc
ed
-T
ur
no
ve
rS
am
pl
e
M
at
ch
ed
Sa
m
pl
e
Pr
ob
it
R
es
ul
ts
Pr
ob
it
R
es
ul
ts
Pr
ob
it
R
es
ul
ts
Pr
ob
it
R
es
ul
ts
Pr
ob
it
R
es
ul
ts
Pr
ob
it
R
es
ul
ts
w
ith
ou
tF
irm
w
ith
R
an
do
m
w
ith
ou
tF
irm
w
ith
R
an
do
m
w
ith
ou
tF
irm
w
ith
R
an
do
m
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y
V
ar
ia
bl
es
a
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
s
Co
ns
ta
nt
2
14
.8
79
**
2
15
.7
15
**
2
18
.1
16
**
2
18
.8
03
**
2
13
.5
03
**
2
13
.5
06
**
(2
11
.4
61
)
(2
12
.8
08
)
(2
9.
13
9)
(2
10
.3
10
)
(2
7.
38
5)
(2
7.
38
7)
N
at
ur
al
lo
g
o
fd
ire
ct
or
’s
ag
e
3.
59
7*
*
3.
78
9*
*
4.
49
3*
*
4.
62
9*
*
3.
13
4*
*
3.
13
5*
*
(11
.26
9)
(12
.71
7)
(9.
31
7)
(10
.29
7)
(6.
96
1)
(6.
96
3)
N
at
ur
al
lo
g
o
fs
al
es
2
.
08
6*
2
.
08
4*
2
.
12
7*
2
.
11
8
2
.
00
2
2
.
00
2
(2
2.
46
8)
(2
2.
11
1)
(2
2.
26
4)
(2
1.
39
0)
(2
.
03
4)
(2
.
03
4)
B
oa
rd
siz
e
.
04
4*
*
.
04
7*
.
04
2
.
04
9
.
05
0*
*
.
05
0*
*
(3.
23
0)
(2.
28
1)
(1.
57
0)
(1.
14
0)
(2.
99
2)
(2.
99
3)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
o
fe
qu
ity
o
w
n
ed
by
th
e
di
re
ct
or
2
10
.2
94
**
2
10
.2
80
*
2
28
.1
20
**
2
28
.0
93
*
2
1.
13
5
2
1.
13
3
(2
2.
71
3)
(2
2.
27
7)
(2
3.
26
9)
(2
2.
29
1)
(2
.
25
2)
(2
.
25
1)
D
ire
ct
or
is
an
in
de
pe
nd
en
to
u
ts
id
er
(1
if
2
.
09
8
2
.
10
1
2
.
14
3
2
.
14
4
2
.
06
5
2
.
06
5
ye
s,
0
if
n
o
)
(2
1.
14
3)
(2
1.
18
7)
(2
1.
12
3)
(2
1.
03
0)
(2
.
53
7)
(2
.
53
7)
N
um
be
ro
fo
th
er
di
re
ct
or
sh
ip
s
he
ld
2
.
00
2
.
00
7
.
00
6
.
00
2
2
.
02
1
2
.
02
1
(2
.
09
3)
(.2
88
)
(.2
32
)
(.0
42
)
(2
.
75
7)
(2
.
75
7)
D
ire
ct
or
is
a
m
em
be
ro
fm
o
n
ito
rin
g
co
m
-
2
.
08
2
2
.
08
7
.
19
2
.
21
2
2
.
22
51
2
.
22
51
m
itt
ee
(1
if
ye
s,
0
if
n
o
)
(2
.
82
8)
(2
.
72
5)
(1.
24
6)
(1.
08
8)
(2
1.
69
0)
(2
1.
69
0)
Forced CEO Succession 613
D
ire
ct
or
is
a
m
em
be
ro
fd
ec
isi
on
co
m
m
itt
ee
.
14
4
.
06
9
.
35
6*
.
27
6
2
.
15
8
2
.
15
8
(1
if
ye
s,
0
if
n
o
)
(1.
28
8)
(.5
20
)
(2.
26
2)
(1.
00
7)
(2
.
92
9)
(2
.
92
9)
Tw
o-
ye
ar
m
ar
ke
t-a
dju
ste
ds
to
ck
re
tu
rn
.
18
6
.
16
9
2
.
15
0
2
.
18
2
.
35
0
.
35
1
be
fo
re
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
.
86
9
(.5
92
)
(2
.
50
6)
(2
.
42
7)
(.9
94
)
(.9
94
)
O
ne
-y
ea
rm
ar
ke
t-a
dju
ste
ds
to
ck
re
tu
rn
af
te
r
2
.
08
8
2
.
13
7
2
.
53
7*
*
2
.
64
3*
.
20
2
.
20
2
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
(2
.
73
6)
(2
.
94
4)
(2
2.
92
3)
(2
2.
26
8)
(1.
15
1)
(1.
15
1)
FO
RC
ED
(1
if
fir
m
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
fo
rc
ed
.
34
3*
*
.
37
2*
*
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
,
0
if
n
o
)
(3.
58
3)
(2.
91
2)
V
O
LU
N
TA
RY
(1
if
fir
m
ha
d
v
o
lu
nt
ar
y
.
17
2
.
17
7
×
×
×
×
×
×
.
13
9
.
13
9
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
,
0
if
n
o
)
(1.
49
8)
(.9
99
)
(1.
17
8)
(1.
17
8)
N
ew
CE
O
is
fro
m
o
u
ts
id
e
th
e
fir
m
(1
if
.
08
4
.
09
4
ye
s,
0
if
n
o
)
×
×
×
×
×
×
(.6
25
)
(.4
59
)
×
×
×
×
×
×
N
um
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
1,
11
6
54
0
57
6
N
ot
e.
—
Th
is
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
tim
at
es
(an
dt
-
st
at
ist
ic
s)
o
ft
he
lik
el
ih
oo
d
o
fa
n
o
u
ts
id
e
di
re
ct
or
le
av
in
g
th
e
bo
ar
d
o
fd
ire
ct
or
s
fo
ra
sa
m
pl
e
o
fd
ire
ct
or
s
dr
aw
n
fro
m
66
fir
m
s
th
at
fo
rc
ed
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
an
d
a
m
at
ch
ed
sa
m
pl
e
o
f6
6
fir
m
s
th
at
di
d
n
o
t
fo
rc
e
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
.A
di
re
ct
or
is
de
fin
ed
as
le
av
in
g
th
e
bo
ar
d
if
he
o
r
sh
e
is
n
o
tl
ist
ed
as
a
di
re
ct
or
o
n
th
e
pr
ox
y
st
at
em
en
td
at
ed
4
ye
ar
sf
ol
lo
w
in
g
fo
rc
ed
CE
O
tu
rn
ov
er
.I
n
ad
di
tio
n
to
es
tim
at
in
g
a
st
an
da
rd
pr
ob
it
m
o
de
l,
a
ra
n
do
m
-e
ffe
ct
sp
ro
bi
tm
o
de
lw
as
es
tim
at
ed
in
an
ef
fo
rt
to
co
n
tr
ol
fo
rfi
rm
ef
fe
ct
s.
Th
os
e
di
re
ct
or
s
th
at
be
co
m
e
th
e
n
ew
CE
O
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
fro
m
th
e
an
al
ys
is.
a
M
ea
su
re
d
pr
io
rt
o
tu
rn
ov
er
ex
ce
pt
w
he
re
n
o
te
d.
1
In
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
tim
at
e
is
st
at
ist
ic
al
ly
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
*
In
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
tim
at
e
is
st
at
ist
ic
al
ly
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
th
e
5%
le
ve
l.
*
*
In
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
tim
at
e
is
st
at
ist
ic
al
ly
sig
ni
fic
an
ta
t
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
614 Journal of Business
explanatory variable and significantly increases the likelihood that an
outside director will leave the board independent of sample or specifi-
cation.
Directors of larger firms, as indicated by the natural log of sales, are
less likely to leave the board in the combined sample, suggesting that
these directors are reluctant to give up the prestige associated with serv-
ing on the board of a large firm. As argued by Kaplan and Reishus
(1990), firm size may increase the opportunities available to directors
for other outside directorships. Directors may be less inclined to resign
from the board of a large firm because of the loss in reputational capital
they would experience. Column 3 in table 3 indicates that this result
is driven by the forced-turnover sample, although the significance of
this variable is sensitive to the inclusion of random effects.
In the combined sample results, the coefficient associated with board
size is positive and statistically significant, indicating that large boards
have a higher departure rate than small boards. Yermack (1996) argues
that small boards perform better than large boards because they have
fewer decision-making and communication problems. Based on this
argument, it is not surprising that smaller boards also tend to have lower
director departure rates. Further, board size is not significant in ex-
plaining director departure in the forced-turnover sample. The directors
in this sample were able to overcome at least some decision-making
and communication problems, as evidenced by their ability to force
CEO turnover. The positive and significant coefficient associated with
board size in the matched sample is consistent with Yermack’s argu-
ment that larger boards experience more difficulties in accomplishing
firm objectives.
The coefficient associated with equity ownership is negative and sta-
tistically significant in the combined sample. In the forced-turnover
sample, the coefficient on the percentage of equity owned by a director
is nearly three times larger than that for the combined sample. The
coefficient is not statistically significant (at conventional levels) for the
matched sample. The results suggest that a director serving on a board
that forces CEO turnover will experience a lower probability of turn-
over if the director holds a higher percentage of equity ownership
relative to other directors serving on that board. Therefore, equity
ownership provides some protection against the potential adverse
consequences of forcing CEO turnover.27
In each of the three versions of equation (1), we find little evidence
that the number of other directorships held or a director’s independence
27. The results do not suggest, however, that directors in the forced-turnover sample
have greater equity ownership than directors that do not force CEO turnover. Note in table
1 that there are no significant differences in equity ownership for outside directors between
the forced-turnover and matched-sample firms.
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influences the likelihood that a director leaves the board. There is some
evidence, however, that those directors that were members of a deci-
sion-making committee are more likely to leave the board of a forced-
turnover firm.28 This is consistent with the hypothesis that directors that
serve on a decision-making committee may share accountability with
senior managers to a greater extent than directors that are not members.
Firm performance appears to have little impact on director departure
in the combined sample. When the sample is limited to the forced-
turnover sample, however, the results suggest a lower probability of
outside-director departure if the firm experiences good performance
after forcing CEO turnover.29 This is consistent with outside directors
being valued for their decision-making expertise. If the firm performs
poorly after the board of directors forces CEO turnover, either the deci-
sion to fire the CEO or the replacement decision is perceived poorly,
and the participating outside directors are more likely to leave the
board. On the other hand, if the firm performs well after a forced CEO
turnover, the decision is viewed favorably and the directors are more
likely to remain on the board. For the matched-sample directors, on
the other hand, performance has no significant impact on the likelihood
that outside directors leave the board.
In the combined sample, the coefficient associated with a forced turn-
over is positive and statistically significant, indicating that directors in
the forced-turnover sample experience an increased likelihood of leav-
ing the board. As noted previously, the turnover process itself may
result in some restructuring of the board independent of the type of
turnover. We attempt to control for a new CEO installing his or her
own board by including a dummy variable for voluntary turnovers. The
variable is not statistically significant (at conventional levels) in all
regressions, suggesting that these directors do not experience an in-
crease in the likelihood of leaving the board following a voluntary CEO
turnover. This latter result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach
(1988) who find no relationship between outside-director turnover and
CEO turnover. Our results suggest that those directors who force a
CEO to resign suffer adverse consequences for their efforts. The direc-
tors that participate in the forced removal of a CEO are more likely to
leave the board than their matched-sample counterparts, even relative
to directors that sit on the board of a firm that experiences voluntary
CEO turnover.
28. It should be noted, however, that the coefficient associated with this variable is
sensitive to the inclusion of random effects.
29. One potential concern with these results is that some of the directors leave the board
before the end of the year that follows CEO turnover. Therefore, the departure of these
directors should not be related to the postturnover performance. To determine whether the
results are sensitive to the inclusion of these directors, we estimated equation (1) excluding
directors that leave the board within 1 year following forced CEO turnover. The results
of this specification of the probit model are very similar to those reported in table 3.
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2. Forced CEO turnover versus voluntary CEO turnover. A more
rigorous test to control for a general turnover effect is to separate our
matched sample into the 28 firms experiencing voluntary CEO turnover
and the 38 firms experiencing no turnover. We report regression results
for the two samples and their corresponding forced-turnover-sample
firms in table 4. We continue to find a higher probability of outside-
director turnover in the forced-turnover-sample firms relative to the
matched-sample firms regardless of whether the matched-sample firms
experience voluntary or no turnover.
Overall, the probit results suggest that forced CEO turnover is associ-
ated with greater uncertainty for an outside director in terms of his or
her tenure on the board. Specifically, firing a CEO appears to result in
adverse consequences for a director. Within the forced-turnover sam-
ple, differences in firm size, equity ownership, committee member-
ships, and firm performance are significant in determining the likeli-
hood of departure. In particular, the results for the forced-turnover
sample suggest that those directors that are closely aligned with the
CEO, as evidenced by their service on a decision-making committee,
and own little equity are more likely to leave the board. Moreover, a
director is more likely to leave if the CEO turnover or replacement
decision is perceived by the market to be a poor one, that is, if the firm
performs poorly after CEO turnover.
An alternative interpretation of the results is that outside directors
of firms that force CEO turnover are more inclined to leave the board
voluntarily than the outside directors of firms that experience volun-
tary CEO turnover or no CEO turnover. Unfortunately, data are not
available to distinguish between those directors in the forced-turnover
sample that participated in the forced removal of the CEO and those
that supported the CEO. The results of voting by the board are not
made public and only rarely are the opinions of individual directors
made public. In addition, reasons for director resignations are rarely
made public, making it difficult to determine whether an individual
director’s departure from a board is voluntary or is the result of pres-
sure from the CEO or other directors.30
Similarly, one could argue that the appointment of a new CEO may
require directors with a different set of skills and that forced CEO turn-
over may result in more substantial restructuring of the board than vol-
untary CEO turnover. Therefore, we cannot conclude that forcing CEO
turnover leads to outside directors being punished in the market for
their services. However, we can conclude that outside directors tend
30. In some cases, proxy statements announce a director’s death or reaching the manda-
tory retirement age. However, the death rate or incidence of mandatory retirement of direc-
tors should not systematically differ between the forced turnover and matched samples.
Therefore, we do not attempt to control for these types of departure.
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to suffer adverse consequences in the form of a higher probability of
departure from the board after forcing CEO turnover. In the next sec-
tion we analyze whether outside directors that force CEO turnover ex-
perience any consequences in terms of their service on other boards.
IV. Analysis of Other Directorships
The second potential consequence for a director forcing CEO turnover
is a change in the opportunities available for other directorships outside
of the firm. Extant evidence suggests that bad managers and bad direc-
tors lose directorships. For example, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) report
that poorly performing managers hold fewer directorships than manag-
ers of other firms. Gilson (1990) finds that directors who leave the
board of a financially distressed firm tend to lose other directorships.
To our knowledge, however, no study has examined whether directors
that perform effectively experience any significant consequences in
terms of the other directorships they hold.
A. Changes in Other Directorships
By forcing CEO turnover, directors send an unambiguous signal of
their willingness to monitor and discipline senior managers. Therefore,
according to the Fama and Jensen (1983) argument, we would expect
these directors to experience an increase in the number of other direc-
torships they hold as compared to the number of other directorships
held by the directors of matched-sample firms.
The alternative argument, however, is that managers have significant
control over the director selection process and are reluctant to appoint
directors that might challenge them. Mace (1986) argues that outside
directors are often friends and associates of senior managers and that
outside directors are selected for their ability to advise senior managers,
not their willingness to challenge senior managers. Therefore, ac-
cording to this argument, we should observe a decrease in the number
of other directorships held by directors that force CEO turnover relative
to their matched-sample counterparts.
As in the previous section, we expect age to be related to changes
in the number of other directorships because older directors are more
likely to retire and less likely to accept additional directorships. There
is no reason, however, to expect the number of normal retirements to
differ systematically between the turnover and matched samples.
We also find in the previous section that those directors remaining
on the board of a firm that forced CEO turnover tend to be those that
own substantial equity in the firm, that were not closely aligned with
the outgoing CEO, and whose firms performed relatively well follow-
ing the CEO’s removal. We include a variable, STAY (one if director
stays on board, zero if not), that should capture the effect of these direc-
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tors having a higher probability of remaining on the board after forcing
CEO turnover. If the director labor market rewards directors that per-
form well, as suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983), then these direc-
tors should face an increased likelihood of gaining additional director-
ships. If the director labor market does not reward good performance,
then these directors should not gain any more directorships than those
that left the board or the directors in the matched sample.
Large firms tend to have more contracting relations with other firms
than small firms, thus there may be more opportunities for other direc-
torships for directors that sit on large firms’ boards. In addition, the
reputational capital associated with serving on the board of a large firm
may lead to additional directorship opportunities (see, e.g., Booth and
Deli 1996).
Finally, the directors’ decision-making expertise may affect the like-
lihood of their gaining or losing directorships. As in the previous sec-
tion, the number of other directorships held by a director may be a
reasonable proxy for the director’s decision-making expertise and the
success of the replacement CEO may be a measure of the board’s ag-
gregate decision-making ability.
B. Empirical Results for Changes in Other Directorships
Table 5 summarizes the number of directorships gained and lost in the
4-year period following forced CEO turnover. The number of director-
ships gained ranges from zero to seven. The number of directorships
lost ranges from zero to eight. About 58% (158 of 274) of the forced-
turnover-sample directors that remain on the board gain new director-
ships while about 56% (154 of 274) lost at least one directorship. Of
the matched-sample directors that remain on the board, about 50% (172
of 342) gain at least one new directorship while about 58% (197 of
342) lose a directorship.
Of those directors that leave the board, we were able to find complete
directorship information for 51% (136 of 266) of the forced-turnover-
sample directors and 48% (112 of 234) of the matched-sample direc-
tors. Of these, 48% (65 of 136) of the forced-turnover-sample directors
and 43% (48 of 112) of the matched-sample directors gained new direc-
torships. In addition, at least 69% (183 of 266) of the forced-turnover
sample directors and at least 67% (156 of 234) of the matched-sample
directors that leave the board lost a directorship.
To examine formally whether directors in the forced-turnover sample
are more likely to gain or lose directorships, we estimate two probit
models. The first model has a dependent variable equal to one for direc-
tors that gain a new directorship in the 4-year period following forced
CEO turnover and zero for directors that did not gain any new director-
ships. The second model has a dependent variable equal to one for
directors that lose a directorship in the 4-year period following forced
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TABLE 5 Changes in Directorships Held by Outside Directors of 66 Firms
Experiencing Forced CEO Turnover and 66 Matched Firms that
Do Not Experience Forced CEO Turnover
Directors that Directors that Leave
Remain on Sample Sample Firm’s
Firm’s Board Board
Forced- Forced-
Turnover Matched Turnover Matched
Sample Sample Sample Sample
Other directorships acquired:
Zero 116 170 71 64
One 82 82 26 25
Two 43 51 22 14
Three 16 23 11 8
More than three 17 16 6 1
Not found on Lexis-Nexis or volume
2 of the S&P Register × × × × × × 130 122
Other directorships lost:
None to lose 36 47 45 41
Zero 84 98 31 30
One 80 100 78 57
Two 39 60 35 50
Three 22 19 28 17
More than three 13 18 42 32
Unable to verify any lost director-
ships using volume 1 of the S&P
Register × × × × × × 7 7
Number of directors 274 342 266 234
Note.—This table describes the directorships acquired and directorships lost for outside directors
in a sample of 66 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force
CEO turnover. Directorships acquired and lost were determined by comparing the directorships held
by individual directors prior to forced CEO turnover (as indicated in the preturnover proxy statement)
to the directorships held by the directors 4 years after the forced CEO turnover. The postturnover
directorships are identified in sample firms’ proxy statements for those directors that remain on the
board. For those directors that leave the board, we searched both Lexis-Nexis and volume 2 of the
S&P Register for information about the directorships held by individual directors. For those directors
that are not found in either Lexis-Nexis or volume 2 (Executives and Directors) of the S&P Register,
we searched volume 1 (Corporations) of the S&P Register in an effort to verify lost directorships.
Those directors that become the new CEO are excluded from the analysis.
CEO turnover and zero for directors that did not lose any directorships.
This is similar to the approach taken by Kaplan and Reishus (1990).31
31. An alternative to Kaplan and Reishus’s (1990) methodology is to estimate one model
with a dependent variable equal to one if the director’s net change in directorships is
positive (zero if the net change is not positive) and another model with a dependent variable
equal to one if the director’s net change in directorships is negative (zero if the net change
is not negative). The results of using this methodology are similar to the results given in
tables 6 and 7. Still another approach would be to estimate an ordered logit model with
a dependent variable indicating whether a director is a net gainer of directorships, experi-
ences no change in directorships, or is a net loser of directorships. This approach yields
poor results because the explanatory variables do not have the same impact on new director-
ships as they do on lost directorships. In addition, many directors do not have any other
directorships prior to CEO turnover, making it inappropriate to include them in any analysis
that includes lost directorships.
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Because of differences in the way directorship data were collected for
the directors that remain on a sample firm’s board and directors that
leave a sample firm’s board, we estimate five versions of each probit
model. First we estimate the model for all directors. Next, we estimate
the model separately for the turnover and matched samples. Finally,
we estimate separate models for those directors that remain on a sample
firm’s board and those that leave a sample firm’s board.
One could argue that the exclusion of directors who cannot be found
will bias our results. The expectation would be to observe a positive
coefficient estimate for the FORCED variable if a disproportionately
large fraction of the directors who depart firms with forced turnover
were excluded from the analysis. However, as noted in table 5, we are
unable to locate directors in Lexis-Nexis or volume 2 of the S&P Regis-
ter for 52% of the directors that leave the matched-sample firms versus
49% of the directors that leave the forced-turnover-sample firms.
Therefore, the potential bias associated with missing directorship data
would not explain the reported results.
1. Results for new directorships. The results of estimating the
probit model for new directorships are given in table 6. Only those
directors for whom complete directorship data were available are in-
cluded in this analysis. Therefore, many of the directors that left the
board of a sample firm are excluded. The negative coefficient on the
natural log of a director’s age indicates that older directors are less
likely to acquire a new directorship. Interestingly, the more director-
ships a director holds, the more likely he or she is to acquire an addi-
tional directorship. Further, those that remain on the board of a sample
firm are more likely to acquire an additional directorship than those
that leave the board of a sample firm, as indicated by the positive coef-
ficient on the STAY variable.
The coefficient on the FORCED variable is positive and significant
in the probit results for all directors, suggesting that those directors that
participate in the forced removal of a CEO are rewarded in the market
for their services as a director. However, when we estimate separate
models for directors that remain on the board and those that leave the
board, we find that the coefficient on FORCED is only significant for
directors that remain on a sample firm’s board. The directors that leave
the board of a firm that forced CEO turnover are no more (or less)
likely to acquire additional directorships than directors that leave the
board of a matched-sample firm. Further, within the matched sample,
there is no significant difference in the likelihood of gaining additional
directorships for directors that remain on the sample firm’s board and
those that leave. Within the forced-turnover sample, directors that re-
main on the sample firm’s board are significantly more likely to acquire
additional directorships. Therefore, although there is some evidence
suggesting that directors are rewarded for disciplining a poorly per-
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forming CEO, these rewards only extend to those directors that con-
tinue to serve on the firm’s board.32
2. Results of lost directorships. The results of estimating the probit
model of lost directorships are given in table 7. Only those directors
that held at least one other directorship prior to forced CEO turnover
are included in this analysis. The positive coefficient on the natural log
of a director’s age indicates that older directors are more likely to lose
directorships. However, this result applies only to directors that leave
the board of a sample firm. Also, the more directorships a director
holds, the more likely he or she is to lose a directorship. Those directors
that remain on a sample firm’s board were less likely to lose director-
ships than directors that leave the board of a sample firm for both the
turnover and matched samples. Finally, our results suggest that the di-
rectors that forced CEO turnover are no more (or less) likely to lose
a directorship than their matched-firm counterparts, regardless of
whether they remain on the board or leave the board.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient on the log of firm sales
is negative for those directors that remain on a sample firm’s board
and positive for those directors that leave the board. These results sug-
gest that directors of large firms are less likely to lose other director-
ships than directors of small firms as long as they remain on the board.
When a director of a large firm leaves the board, he is more likely to
lose other directorships than a director that leaves the board of a small
firm. This is consistent with the directors of large firms enjoying greater
prestige and reputations than directors of small firms.
Overall, our results suggest that participating in the forced removal
of a CEO does not lead to a director losing other directorships regard-
less of whether the director remains on the board or leaves the board
after the CEO turnover. The results for other directorships gained sug-
gest that directors are rewarded for disciplining a poorly performing
CEO if the directors continue to serve on the firm’s board.
V. Conclusion
By examining the determinants of whether a director leaves the board
in the 4-year period following forced CEO turnover, we provide evi-
dence on whether forced CEO turnover affects director tenure. By ex-
amining changes in the number of other directorships held, we provide
evidence of whether directors that force CEO turnover experience
changes in other directorships that differ from their matched-firm
counterparts.
We find evidence suggesting that outside directors of firms that force
32. Similar results are found when those directors over the age of 65 at the time of
forced CEO turnover are excluded from the analysis shown in table 6.
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CEO turnover are more likely to leave the firm than outside directors
of firms that do not force CEO turnover, even those that experience
voluntary CEO turnover. However, it tends to be those directors that
were closely aligned with the outgoing CEO, as evidenced by their
service on a decision-making committee, and own little equity that are
most likely to leave the board of a firm that forced CEO turnover.
Further, the directors of firms that perform poorly following forced
CEO turnover are more likely to leave the firm.
We also find evidence that those directors remaining on the board
of a firm that forced CEO turnover are rewarded in the market for their
services as a director. These directors tend to be those that were not
closely aligned with the outgoing CEO, owned substantial equity in
the firm, and whose firms performed well following the forced CEO
turnover. These directors are more likely to gain at least one new direc-
torship than those directors that remain on the board of a matched-
sample firm. These directors are also no more likely to lose other di-
rectorships. The evidence is consistent with the market for outside
directors rewarding those directors that remove a poorly performing
CEO and make good replacement decisions.
One interpretation of the overall results is that effective monitoring
of a poorly performing CEO is a risky gamble involving two decisions.
First, directors must determine whether it is necessary to force CEO
turnover, and then directors must choose the successor. Our results sug-
gest that directors only receive rewards for their efforts if they make
both decisions successfully. This may explain the anecdotal evidence
presented by Lublin and Duff (1995) that many directors are reluctant
to remove a poorly performing CEO.
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